Cold War 2.0

Covert surveillance is a valuable tool of espionage.
During WWII, Britain's spy organizations went to extraordinary lengths to ensure the breaking of the enigma code was kept secret...not just to the Germans but to its allies.
Apart from the careful calculation of when to use the ultra-secret information to win the Battle of the Atlantic, British intelligence created a fictional MI6 master spy, Boniface, who controlled a fictional series of agents throughout Germany. Information obtained through code-breaking was often attributed to the human intelligence from the Boniface network.
Such counterintelligence skills have only become more sophisticated in the last 60 years.

Front page panic in The Weekend Australian on China espionage

Mark Gregory is an associate professor in network engineering at RMIT in Melbourne. He has written a string of interesting tech articles in the sensible academically-inclined webzine The Conversation.
He was asked his thoughts on the gathering China-US Cold War over Huawei and ZTE in a New Daily article by John Elder.
After outlining the push on Huawei by the security agencies, Gregory said there have been no publicly revealed documents showing evidence of Huawei engaged in espionage.
“The only public documents are the Snowden papers, and they showed that it was American agencies that have used telcos to spy on people,” he said.
“The NSA has been doing the same thing that Huawei is being accused of. But there are no pubic (evidence) that shows that Huawei has been a conduit for the Chinese government.

Slide from an NSA presentation on "Google Cloud Exploitation"
 exposed in the Snowden Papers; the sketch shows
 where the Public Internet meets the Google Cloud.

"That’s not to say day there isn’t a concern or something going on.”
Dr Gregory said that Cold War 2.0 prophesied 15 years ago, when the intellectual property and technology transfer methodologies being used by China were identified, and concerns have been growing since this time.

As he has in other articles, Gregory then points out that Australia should "have a whole-of-life security assurance capability to ensure that all equipment and systems used in the telecommunications networks are safe to use”